

Handout 9: Fictitious Play

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(Based on Shoham and Leyton-Brown 2011)

Introduction

Fictitious play is one of the earliest learning rules and employs an intuitive update rule. It is usually viewed as a model of learning, albeit a simplistic one.

Fictitious play is an instance of **model-based learning**, in which the learner explicitly maintains beliefs about the opponent's strategy.

The structure of such techniques is straightforward.

Initialize beliefs about the opponent's strategy

Repeat

Play a best response to the assessed strategy of the opponent

Observe the opponent's actual play and update beliefs accordingly

End Repeat

Assumptions:

- The agent is *oblivious* to the payoffs obtained or obtainable by other agents.
- The agent knows its own payoff matrix in the stage game (i.e., the payoff it would get in each action profile, whether or not encountered in the past).
- The agent believes that its opponent is playing the mixed strategy given by the empirical distribution of the opponent's previous actions.

That is, if A is the set of the opponent's actions, and for every $a \in A$ we let $w(a)$ be the number of times that the opponent has played action a , then the agent assesses the probability of a in the opponent's mixed strategy as

$$P(a) = \frac{w(a)}{\sum_{a' \in A} w(a')}$$

For example, in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game, if the opponent has played Cooperate, Cooperate, Defect, Cooperate, and Defect in the first five games, before the sixth game it is assumed to be playing the mixed strategy (0.6:Cooperate, 0.4:Defect).

There exist different versions of fictitious play which differ on the *tie-breaking* method used to select an action when there is more than one best response to the particular mixed strategy induced by an agent's beliefs. In general the tie-breaking rule chosen has little effect on the results of fictitious play.

On the other hand, *fictitious play is very sensitive to the players' initial beliefs*. This choice, which can be interpreted as action counts that were observed before the start of the game, can have a radical impact on the learning process. Note that one must pick some nonempty prior belief for each agent; the prior beliefs cannot be $(0, \dots, 0)$ since this does not define a meaningful mixed strategy.

Fictitious play is somewhat paradoxical in that *each agent assumes a stationary policy of the opponent, yet no agent plays a stationary policy except when the process happens to converge to one.*

Example. Matching Pennies. Two players are playing a repeated game of Matching Pennies. Each player is using the fictitious play learning rule to update its beliefs and select actions. Player 1 pockets both pennies if they are matched. Player 2 pockets both if they are not matched. Player 1 begins the game with the prior belief that player 2 has played heads 1.5 times and tails 2 times. Player 2 begins with the prior belief that player 1 has played heads 2 times and tails 1.5 times. How will the players play? The first seven rounds of play of the game is shown in Table 7.1.

Round	1's action	2's action	1's beliefs	2's beliefs
0			(1.5,2)	(2,1.5)
1	T	T	(1.5,3)	(2,2.5)
2	T	H	(2.5,3)	(2,3.5)
3	T	H	(3.5,3)	(2,4.5)
4	H	H	(4.5,3)	(3,4.5)
5	H	H	(5.5,3)	(4,4.5)
6	H	H	(6.5,3)	(5,4.5)
7	H	T	(6.5,4)	(6,4.5)
...				
...				

Table 7.1: Fictitious play of a repeated game of Matching Pennies.

As you can see, each player ends up alternating back and forth between playing heads and tails. In fact, as the number of rounds tends to infinity, the empirical distribution of the play of each player will converge to (0.5, 0.5). If we take this distribution to be the mixed strategy of each player, the play converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of the normal form stage game, that in which each player plays the mixed strategy (0.5, 0.5).