CSCE475/875 Multiagent
Systems
Handout 16: Game Day 3Auction
Day Analysis
November 11, 2011
Auction Rounds
Table 1 shows some of the basic information for each of the 15 rounds of auction. SIB won three times. Reagent, Split Second, and Triplet Threat won twice. And the rest (6 teams) won once each.
Rd. |
Auction |
Winner (#) |
Winning Bid |
Payment |
1 |
English |
Power Agents (1) |
$300 |
$300 |
2 |
Japanese |
Split Second (1) |
$310 |
$310 |
3 |
Dutch |
ULM (1) |
$310 |
$310 |
4 |
Sealed, First Price |
Wolfpack (1) |
$300 |
$300 |
5 |
Vickrey |
Free Agents (1) |
$305 |
$301 |
6 |
English |
Reagent (1) |
$300 |
$300 |
7 |
Japanese |
SIB (1) |
$240 |
$240 |
8 |
Dutch |
DJ Carpet (1) |
$310 |
$310 |
9 |
Sealed, First Price |
SIB (2) |
$301 |
$301 |
10 |
Vickrey |
Triple Threat (1) |
$309 |
$300 |
11 |
English |
SIB (3) |
$299 |
$299 |
12 |
Japanese |
Split Second (2) |
$301 |
$301 |
13 |
Dutch |
Reagent (2) |
$310 |
$310 |
14 |
Sealed, First Price |
JRL (1) |
$405 |
$405 |
15 |
Vickrey |
Triple Threat (2) |
$301 |
$250 |
|
|
|
TOTAL |
$4,537 |
The auctioneer’s market value for each item is the same, $50. As shown later in Table 3, there were 81 “ins” and with a fee $2 for each participation, the auctioneer received $162 from the participation fees. Together, the auctioneer made a gain of $4,537 + $162 – 15x$50 = $3,949.
Team Statistics
Table 2 shows the private valuations of each team for 15 rounds of auctioned items. All teams followed the rules correctly. Most teams (6) assigned $300 to the remaining 5 items outside the 10 required values. I observe no trends in the mean values from round to round. I also observe no patterns per type of auction protocols. It seems that how the valuations were assigned is random.
Now, I look for “opportunities” for teams to make large gains. That is, if there was only one team whose valuation for an item was maximum, then that would be an opportunity for that team to make a gain, especially if the closest valuation was much smaller. For Round 6 (English), Free Agents valued the item at $300. The next closest valuation was $230 by JRL and Reagent. As shown in Table 3, Free Agents participated in this round but did not win the round. Why? From Table 1, we see that Reagent won this round, bidding $300 for an item that they valued only as much as $230. Then there were also weaker opportunities where there were only two teams having the same maximum values, as in Rounds 4, 5, 7, 11, 14, and 15. I designated these opportunities as “weaker” as they depended on whether one of the two teams participated in the round. If one of them did not and the other did, then it would become a real opportunity. From Table 3, we see that in all those rounds, both the maximum valuation teams participated. But in Round 15, one of the maximum valuation team (i.e., Triple Threat, see Table 1) netted a big gain. Why? SIB, one of the maximum valuation team, under-valued and put in a bid of $150, much lower than their valuation of the item ($300). (Incidentally, Wolfpack over-valued and put in a bid of $250, $40 higher than their valuation of the item ($210).) Had SIB put in a more rational bid (e.g., $298), they would have prevented any other teams from making such a big gain in Round 15. In a way, Round 15 cost the auctioneer money too—it could have received around $300 instead of $250 for the T-rex!
Further, Table 2 also showed that JRL’s valuations were strategically different from the rest. They did not value a single item at $300. Their total of valuations was $2,300, the lowest. Essentially, they set up their valuations for them to be not competitive. Likewise, teams such as Wolfpack, Reagent, and SIB also put themselves at a slight disadvantage with lower valuations. Thus, it was no wonder that some of these teams finished at the bottom half (see Table 4).
Rd. |
Wolf-pack |
DJ Carpet |
ULM |
Free Agents |
Power Agent |
JRL |
Re-agent |
SIB |
Split Second |
Triple
Threat |
Mean |
1 |
$210 |
$300 |
$210 |
$70 |
$300 |
$110 |
$210 |
$30 |
$110 |
$300 |
$1,850 |
2 |
$190 |
$300 |
$150 |
$150 |
$70 |
$150 |
$190 |
$190 |
$300 |
$300 |
$1,990 |
3 |
$170 |
$300 |
$300 |
$130 |
$300 |
$130 |
$300 |
$230 |
$170 |
$50 |
$2,080 |
4* |
$300 |
$50 |
$300 |
$190 |
$210 |
$210 |
$110 |
$170 |
$130 |
$210 |
$1,880 |
5* |
$230 |
$70 |
$50 |
$300 |
$190 |
$150 |
$90 |
$110 |
$190 |
$300 |
$1,680 |
6** |
$150 |
$90 |
$190 |
$300 |
$170 |
$230 |
$230 |
$150 |
$210 |
$130 |
$1,850 |
7* |
$130 |
$110 |
$130 |
$230 |
$150 |
$160 |
$130 |
$210 |
$230 |
$110 |
$1,590 |
8 |
$110 |
$300 |
$300 |
$110 |
$130 |
$190 |
$300 |
$130 |
$300 |
$70 |
$1,940 |
9 |
$300 |
$130 |
$300 |
$300 |
$110 |
$180 |
$70 |
$300 |
$150 |
$190 |
$2,030 |
10 |
$230 |
$150 |
$70 |
$300 |
$90 |
$170 |
$300 |
$300 |
$300 |
$300 |
$2,210 |
11* |
$90 |
$170 |
$170 |
$170 |
$230 |
$90 |
$170 |
$300 |
$300 |
$150 |
$1,840 |
12 |
$70 |
$190 |
$110 |
$300 |
$300 |
$70 |
$150 |
$90 |
$300 |
$170 |
$1,750 |
13 |
$50 |
$300 |
$300 |
$90 |
$300 |
$150 |
$300 |
$70 |
$90 |
$90 |
$1,740 |
14* |
$300 |
$230 |
$230 |
$210 |
$300 |
$260 |
$50 |
$50 |
$70 |
$230 |
$1,930 |
15* |
$210 |
$210 |
$90 |
$50 |
$50 |
$50 |
$30 |
$300 |
$50 |
$300 |
$1,340 |
TOT |
$2,740 |
$2,900 |
$2,900 |
$2,900 |
$2,900 |
$2,300 |
$2,630 |
$2,630 |
$2,900 |
$2,900 |
$27,700 |
Table 2.Private valuations of each team for 15 rounds of auctioned items. ** indicates a round where there was only one maximum valuation. * indicates a round here there were only two maximum valuations.
Table 3 showed the auction rounds that each team participated. ULM participated in ALL rounds (15) while Power Agent participated in only 3 rounds. Power Agent won the first round, and strategized to stay out of most rounds to save the $2 fees. Further, the table shows that not all teams participated in the rounds where they knew they at least shared the maximum valuation of the auctioned item. There were also teams that participated in rounds that they knew they were unlikely to win the auction because of their low valuation of the item being auctioned. That means, these teams were willing to lose $2 for each such round for nothing.
Team |
1 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
7 |
8 |
9 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
13 |
14 |
15 |
TOT |
Wolfpack |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
√ |
10 |
DJ Carpet |
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
|
√ |
|
|
|
|
√ |
|
|
5 |
ULM |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
15 |
Free Agents |
√ |
√ |
|
|
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
√ |
|
10 |
Power Agent |
√ |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
√ |
√ |
|
3 |
JRL |
√ |
√ |
|
√ |
|
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
√ |
√ |
|
9 |
Reagent |
√ |
|
√ |
|
|
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
|
|
6 |
SIB |
|
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
7 |
Split Second |
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
8 |
Triple Threat |
√ |
√ |
|
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
√ |
|
|
|
√ |
√ |
8 |
TOT |
9 |
8 |
6 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
4 |
4 |
6 |
8 |
4 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
4 |
81 |
Table 3.The number of teams “in” (√) for each round of auctions. Bold √ indicates a team’s participation when the team knew going in that it had the maximum valuation (i.e., $300), while a shaded entry indicates a team’s knowledge that it had the maximum valuation (i.e., $300).
Table 4 shows the final utility tally for each team. Per this table, Triple Threat won the Auction Day with $1,656. Indeed, Triple Threat was the only team that made a net positive gain (i.e., $1,656 - $1,622 = $34). JRL fell below $1,500. ULM would have finished higher if they had been more selective in terms of participation in which rounds. (Remember that they participated in all rounds indiscriminately and that cost them a total of $30.) Power Agent, on the other hand, participated in very few rounds and was able to finish high in the ranking. But in general, because of their “risk-averse” behaviors, they were unlikely to make high reward gains.
Rd. |
Original Money |
Utility Gained from Items Won (#) |
Payment |
Participation Fee |
TOTAL |
Triple Threat |
$1,622 |
$600 (2) |
$550.00 |
16 |
$1,656.00 |
Power Agent |
$300 (1) |
$300.00 |
6 |
$1,616.00 |
|
DJ Carpet |
$300 (1) |
$310.00 |
10 |
$1,602.00 |
|
Wolfpack |
$300 (1) |
$300.00 |
20 |
$1,602.00 |
|
Free Agents |
$300 (1) |
$301.00 |
20 |
$1,601.00 |
|
Split Second |
$600 (2) |
$611.00 |
16 |
$1,595.00 |
|
ULM |
$300 (1) |
$310.00 |
30 |
$1,582.00 |
|
SIB |
$810 (3) |
$840.00 |
14 |
$1,578.00 |
|
Reagent |
$530 (2) |
$610.00 |
12 |
$1,530.00 |
|
JRL |
$260 (1) |
$405.00 |
18 |
$1,459.00 |
Table 4.Total utility for each team. Total Utility = Original Money + Utility Gained from Items Won – Payment – Participation Fee.
Individual Team Analysis
Table5 documents my comments on each team’s worksheet and reports.
Table 5. My comments and observations of team strategies, worksheets,
and reports.
Lessons Learned
Here are some overall lessons learned.
1. Teams should rationally assign $300 for the five remaining items. There were four teams that did not do so. Immediately, that put them at a disadvantage. SIB, Reagent, JRL, and Wolfpack were the four teams, and they finished #7, #8, #9, and #10, respectively.
2. Rationally, a team, without knowing or speculating on what other teams might do, should value the Vickrey round items at $300. Why? This would allow a team a chance to be aggressive and put a higher bid with the hope that it would win the item at a second price that is lower than $300.
3. Participating in every round indiscriminately was unwise as the loss of $2 as fee for each round lowered the utility of a team. Team ULM was the only team that participated in all 15 rounds while the most that other teams participated was 10 rounds. All-pay auctions are all-pay for a reason: to make sure that the only teams that have a chance to win an auction are the ones participating. Thus, if a team values an item lowly, then that means the team will have close to 0 chance in winning the item. Then the team should not participate.
4. On the other hand, being conservative and only participating a few rounds might not afford enough opportunities for a team to get high rewards. Power Agent was such a team, playing very rationally. But they lost out to Triple Threat that was willing to take risk.
5. Did the teams with more “opportunities” fare better than teams with fewer “opportunities”?
Table 6 below shows something interesting. I computed the differences between the valuation of each team and the valuation of every other team for each round. I then counted the times a difference is higher, the same, and lower. And then I averaged these numbers across all rounds. Take Wolfpack for example. It has an average #higher evaluation per round of 3.667, an average #same valuation per round of 1.133, and average #lower valuation per round of 4.2. That means, more likely than not, if all agents participated in a round, Wolfpack’s valuation would put the team at a disadvantage. Further in the table, I also included the average difference in valuations per round. JRL, for example, had an average difference in valuations of -$284 per round. As six teams had the same $2,900 total valuations (see Table 2), they all shared the same average difference of $76. Which of these factors would a better predictor as to how the teams would fare? I computed the correlations of each of the four factors with the Final Total Utility: 0.80, 0.26, -0.61, and 0.89. What do these mean? It means that the Average Difference in Valuations per round and Final Total Utility are highly positively correlated (i.e., 0.89). It also means that the Average #Higher Valuation per round and Final Total Utility are also quite highly positively correlated (i.e., 0.80). It implies that the actual difference (in $) is a more accurate predictor. Further, it implies that how a team dominated others is a better predictor than how a team is dominated by others: 0.80 vs. -0.61.
But because the correlation values are not 1.0 or -1.0, that means it was still possible for teams to do better even though their starting point (valuations) was not as good. This is due to two reasons: (1) the actions of other teams, and (2) the actions of the team itself, such as the number of rounds they participated, and the rational or irrational behaviors. Look at Wolfpack, their starting position was #7, but finished tied at #2.
Team |
Average #Higher Valuation per round |
Average #Same Valuation per round |
Average #Lower Valuation per round |
Average Difference in Valuations per round |
Final
Total Utility |
Triple Threat |
3.933 |
1.133 |
3.933 |
76 |
1656 |
Power Agent |
3.867 |
1.2 |
3.4 |
76 |
1616 |
Wolfpack |
3.667 |
1.133 |
4.2 |
-20 |
1602 |
DJ Carpet |
3.4 |
1.333 |
3.933 |
76 |
1602 |
Free Agents |
3.533 |
1.533 |
3.467 |
76 |
1601 |
Split Second |
4.067 |
1.4 |
3.133 |
76 |
1595 |
ULM |
3.4 |
1.6 |
3.467 |
76 |
1582 |
SIB |
3.4 |
0.933 |
4.267 |
-86 |
1578 |
Reagent |
2.933 |
1.6 |
4.067 |
-86 |
1530 |
JRL |
3 |
0.8 |
4.8 |
-284 |
1459 |
Table 6. Comparing each team’s valuations to other
teams’ for each round. A large average
#higher valuation per round means a team’s valuation for that round dominates
quite a few other teams’ and so on.
6. From team DJ Carpet:
We have 5 opportunities to set the IPV with price from $0 to $300. …I would suggest you do a little change. For example, teams still have 5 opportunities to set the IPV, but sum IPV of these 5 items must be less than $2,000.
Setting a higher starting price for Dutch auction.
I noticed the second point during the Auction Day as well. But after having made the poor choice in the first Dutch, in order to be fair to other teams in the second and third Dutch, I stuck with $310 as the starting price for Dutch. I will use these in my future Auction Day.
7. From team Triple Threat:
English
bidding was the most active. It was very fun to watch. It was nice
competitively because you knew who you were bidding against. The biggest
advantage seemed to be to jump to your evaluation first. But most auctions had
two or more bidders with an evaluation $300. In these, no one went above $300.
Japanese
seems like a game of chicken and who flinches first. This was the only auction
that needed arbitration. It was relatively easy to drive up the price to above
your private value.
Sealed
first bid was not ideal for the situation because there was always a $300 bid
so you had to lose utility in order to win. There was no way to “test the
water” or anything like that. The only advantage is the minimization of
communication needed. We tried to use this for an opportunity to get better
utility, but failed.
Dutch
should have started higher. The auctioneer could have made (much) more money if
they had started higher. Our decision to stay out of these worked out well for
us.
8. From team ULM:
Our environment
was not terribly competitive since teams only had to win one item and then
“play it safe” if they desired.
Because of
this, the variation in final utility across teams will be very low.
It appears that overall, teams went on to meet the constraint of winning
one item and gain some utility. No team realized the potential cash power that
they had at their disposal. For example, in our case, if we would have realized
this, we would have played the first 2 rounds in the same way just to make a
picture of the winning prices. Then, on the next 5 to 6 rounds, we could have
overbid around 320-330. This way, the rest of 7 teams (except us and the teams
winning the first 2 rounds) would have been more desperate to win in the last
half and overbid more, thus ending up with less money.
9. Due to the large potential penalty of not winning an item, the teams practiced different types of risk attitudes. When a team was still in need of an item, it was likely to be risk averse – afraid of not winning and thus offering a higher bid; and when a team had won an item, it was likely to be risk seeking – not offering a higher bid.
10. Having said the above, there were several teams, markedly Triple Threat, who was persistent and determined to make sure that other teams lost utility if they won an item. But Triple Threat did this cautiously, respective to their valuations. On the other hand, ULM, who also tried to bid to force the price up, did it a bit too indiscriminately. Thus, it is important to balance one’s approach especially when tradeoffs of opposite factors are present in the environment.
11. From viewpoint of delivering the auctions, Dutch, and the sealed-bids were fast. English was next. Japanese last. In terms of gain, Dutch and the sealed-bids were better for the auctioneer in our environment due to the additional requirements—causing the private values to be not entirely independent—and some less-than-rational bids. English and Japanese both forced teams to reveal their values and thus teams were able to model the others.
12. Software automation made this Game Day smoother than Game Day 2. For future semesters, we will have software for all Game Days.
Game Day League
Here is the final League Standings. Free Agents won the League with a total of 7 points. DJ Carpet finished as a strong second team. Power Agent and Triple Threat both finished at the third position with 11 points, with Split Second closely behind with 13 points. ULM placed sixth. Wolfpack, Reagent, SIB, and JRL finished as the last four teams. Triple Threat improved their position steadily from 7 to 3 to 1.
Team Name |
Learning Day |
Voting Day |
Auction Day |
League Standings |
Free Agents |
1 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
DJ Carpet |
3 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
Power Agent |
2 |
7 |
2 |
11 |
Triple Threat |
7 |
3 |
1 |
11 |
Split Second |
3 |
4 |
6 |
13 |
ULM |
5 |
5 |
7 |
17 |
Wolfpack |
7 |
10 |
3 |
20 |
Reagent |
6 |
9 |
9 |
24 |
SIB |
9 |
8 |
8 |
25 |
JRL |
10 |
6 |
10 |
26 |
Free Agents will sign the Ball of
Fame later this semester in class for winning the Game Days League.