

AGENT-BASED MICRO-STORAGE MANAGEMENT FOR THE SMART GRID

POWER AGENT:

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Source

- Vytelingum, P., T. D. Voice, S. D. Ramchurn, A. Rogers, and N. R. Jennings (2010). Agent-Based Micro-Storage Management for the Smart Grid, *Proceedings of the International Joint Conference of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS'2010)*, pp. 39-46.

Outline



- Introduction
- Model Description
- Game-Theoretic Analysis
- Storage Strategy
- Case study results
- Conclusion
- Our discussion
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Introduction




Introduction

Need for Smart grid :

- ❑ Increasing demand
- ❑ High aggregate losses
- ❑ Ageing assets
- ❑ Environmental concerns
- ❑ Demanding customers
- ❑ Higher efficiency

Smart grid drivers:

- ❑ Communication and IT infrastructure
- ❑ Renewable generation
- ❑ Energy storage system
- ❑ Efficient building systems




Source: <http://smartgrid.epri.com>

Introduction

Energy storage devices:

- ❑ Save electricity
- ❑ Save money
- ❑ Improve reliability
- ❑ Reduce carbon emission
- ❑ Alleviate the peak demand

General strategy: charge at low prices
de-charge at high prices



Introduction

- System's goal:

To alleviate the overall peak of the homes' electricity demand

- Home's goal:

To minimize the cost developing an optimal storage strategy
given:

- The normal electricity usage profiles
- Electricity market price



Model Description

Model Description

- The paper models the smart homes as follows:
 - ▣ Each “house” is an agent
 - ▣ Each agent purchases electricity from suppliers in the electricity market
 - ▣ Time is discrete, in half-hour increments
 - ▣ Home agents making autonomous decisions on:
 - Charging their batteries
 - Using their stored electricity
 - Buying electricity from the grid

Model Description

- Game theoretic framework to reach to Nash equilibrium
- Social welfare metrics:
 - **Diversity Factor:** ratio of sum of maximum individual consumer demands to maximum total system demand
 - **Load Factor:** average power divided by peak power (low Load Factor suggests peaks)
 - **The Grid Carbon Content intensity:** The carbon produced to generate the required electricity



Game-Theoretic Analysis

Game-Theoretic Analysis

- Game is played over a 24-hour period
- Agent's Cost = The total cost of purchasing electricity during the game
- Assumptions:
 - ▣ Agents are rational
 - ▣ Agents have complete information about the market

Game-Theoretic Analysis

□ Minimize:

$$\sum_{i \in I} p_i (b_i^{a+} - b_i^{a-} + l_i^a) + c^a e^a$$

□ Where for agent a and interval i :

- I is the duration of the study
- p_i is market price function
- b_i^{a+} is the battery charging profile
- b_i^{a-} is the battery de-charging profile
- l_i^a is the load demand
- c^a is the operation cost of per unit battery
- e^a is the battery

□ Constraints:

- Storage efficiency
- Charging / discharging limits
- No reselling allowed



Storage Strategy

Storage Strategy

- Learn to adapt the storage:

$$e^a(t+1) = e^a(t) + \beta(e_U^{a^*} - e^a(t))$$

- Where on each day t :
 - $e^a(t)$ is the storage capacity of the agent
 - β is the learning rate of the storage capacity
 - $e_U^{a^*}$ is the desired capacity to minimize the agent's cost
- Adapts to the continuously changing market prices
- Gradually adapts the storage profile of the agent
- **Slow enough storage adaption leads to Nash equilibrium**





Case study results

Case study results

□ Analysis within UK market environment

Representative load profile



UK market model

Case study results




Figure 6: Average Storage Profile converging to Nash Equilibrium.

Case study results




Figure 7: Changing Market Prices (market prices eventually flatten).





Conclusion



Conclusion

Social welfare of the system →



← Savings with and without storage

Conclusion

- The proposed strategy resulted in:
 - Carbon content was reduced by up to 7% by using storage system
 - A maximum savings of up to 13% as compared to a no-storage system
 - Flattened aggregated Peak load
 - Nash equilibrium through storage adaption
 - Maximum social welfare with 38% of the population adopting storage



Our discussion

Our discussion

- Some characteristics of this paper's problem
 - Day-ahead decisions (based on the electricity market price)
 - Not dynamic (changes are sequential and not fast)
 - Discrete (charge/de-charge/buy electricity)
 - Non episodic (battery adaption)
 - Deterministic market/Uncertain battery types
 - Incomplete information (home loads and battery types)

Our discussion

□ Drawbacks

▣ Not realistic

- Myopic agents
- averaged electricity market price
- No communication between agents
- The autonomy of the home agents was ignored.
- The generation capability of the homes was not included.
- Electricity trade between neighbours was not considered.
- Sell-to-grid possibility for the homes was not modelled.
- There was no flexibility in the home's demand based on the electricity price.

- ▣ Battery adaption is not a true learning gained by the agent. It is like a social rule restricting the agents autonomy.


Our discussion

- While autonomy of the individual home agent is important, establishing some rules, like the gradual storage adaption in this paper, is sometimes suitable to obtain a desired emergent behaviour.
- In this problem limiting the autonomy of the agents may not affect the scalability of the solution but it degrades the addictiveness of it.

Our discussion

□ Improvement made in our project:

- Rational homes decide to maximize their benefits based on:
 - Utility of trade with the grid (agents can sell to the grid)
 - Utility of trade with the neighbour (being social)
 - Utility of the home's load priority (autonomy for the agents)
 - Utility of storing electricity (being proactive)
- Two different types of load
- Generation capability
- Objectives:
 - To maximize the social welfare of the system
 - Determine the effects of different loads and the electricity price





Questions?